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Occupational risks, safety, and masculinity: Newfoundland fish harvesters’ experiences and 
understandings of fishery risks 
 
Abstract 
There is no single, objective place from which to assess risk and the best way to assess and 
minimize risk is through seeking input from a variety of different knowledge agents focusing on 
different sources and dimensions of risk and using multiple methodologies. In this paper, I draw 
on Wynne’s work on constructivist-realism and on the feminist literature on masculinity to 
examine fish harvesters’ understandings and experiences of risk and safety in the province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador on Canada’s east coast. Using data drawn from focus groups, phone 
interviews and particularly from individual boat tours with Newfoundland fish harvesters, I 
argue that their understandings and practices of risk and safety are dynamic and that this 
dynamism reflects the intersection of everyday requirements to get the job done in what are often 
uncertain and constrained circumstances associated with the interacting and changing regulatory, 
industrial and environmental contexts in which this work is done. From this perspective, while 
quantifying fisheries risks in terms of fatality, accident or Search and Rescue incident rates is 
important, the inclusion of fish harvesters’ experiences and related safety knowledge in research 
and policy-development designed to reduce risk is imperative. The view from the deck of the 
vessel, fish harvesters’ experiences on the water, not only informs their observations and 
interpretations of risk but offers potential insights into risk and into expert claims about risk that 
should be taken into account when trying to understand fishing risk and improve safety.   
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Occupational risks, safety, and masculinity: Newfoundland fish harvesters’ experiences and 
understandings of fishery risks 
 
 
Introduction 
 
National fatality, injury and accident rates indicate that fishing is one of the most dangerous 
occupations (Petursdottir et al., 2001: p. 1-4). There is a growing body of international literature 
describing the extent, severity and causes of occupational health and safety (OHS) risks 
associated with fishing work (Binkley, 1995; Guernsey, 1999; Jenson et al., 2005; Jensen et al., 
1996; Jenson, 1996; McDonald & Kucera, 2007; Murray & Dolomount, 1994, 1995; Murray et 
al., 1997; Petursdottir et al., 2001; Pelot, 2000; Poggie & Pollnac, 1997; Pollnac et al., 1995; 
Wiseman et al., 2000). Research on fishing safety spans several disciplines and is often 
completed in collaboration with government and industry associations. As a result, the 
approaches to and conceptualisations of risk found in the literature are varied. A substantial 
proportion treats risk as objective, unproblematic and scientifically determined. In this literature, 
risk is measured by counting Search and Rescue incidents, fatalities, vessel sinkings, accidents 
and injuries (Windle et al., submitted). This quantitative approach to the analysis of risk reflects 
the dominance of particular disciplines, especially engineering and naval architecture, and 
government agencies responsible for monitoring and promoting fishing safety. In this segment of 
the literature on fishing safety, concerns about the reliability of risk estimates tend to focus on 
issues related to gaps in administrative data and problems with underreporting (Bena et al., 2004; 
Jenson et al., 2005; Wiseman et al., 2000: p. 9-10). The usual measures prescribed in this 
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literature for reducing risk include technological and regulatory fixes aimed at the vessel or the 
individual and designed to reduce the effects of human error (Petursdottir et al., 2001; Van Noy, 
1995).   
 
Another segment of the fishing safety and risk literature largely carried out by social scientists 
focuses on fish harvesters’ perceptions of risk and attitudes about safety (Murray & Dolomount, 
1994, 1995; Murray et al., 1997; Poggie & Pollnac, 1997; Pollnac et al., 1995). In their work on 
commercial fish harvesters in New England, for example, Pollnac et al. (1995: p. 154) argue that 
the “psycho-cultural strategy of denial and trivialization of danger is adaptive among fishermen 
by reducing stress and anxiety and allowing them to make a living in a dangerous occupation ... 
At the same time, they are creating an unrealistic long-term mental environment for themselves 
in which real dangers are not being adequately addressed” (see also Poggie & Pollnac, 1997). 
The perceptions of risk literature draws attention to the existence of different ways of knowing 
and thinking about risk within fisheries – expert-scientific knowledge and lay perceptions. It 
tends to focus on the gap between fish harvesters’ perceptions of risk and the real, objective risk 
identified by experts, as well as the disjuncture between what harvesters know about risk and 
safety and how they behave.  
 
Other risk researchers, primarily outside of fisheries, have challenged the equation of expert 
knowledge with real, objective risk.  Wynne, for example, argues that “[r]isk has become the 
form of public discourse through which public meaning is given to technology and innovation, as 
defined in institutional discourses such as government, media, legal and commercial, all deriving 
from the scientific” (2002: p. 460). In other words, there are multiple ways of understanding risk, 
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but expert, scientific knowledge is hegemonic among these different knowledge systems and this 
status, as much as its superiority over lay knowledge, underlies its acceptance as truth. As argued 
in research on traditional or local knowledge (see, for example, Haggan et al., 2007) the 
hegemonic status of research by safety experts may be marginalizing and masking important 
insights about safety and risk available from other sources including the observations and 
experiences of fish harvesters. From the perspective of Wynne and others, avoiding this potential 
pitfall requires a “de-privileging” of hegemonic knowledges and risk constructions.  
 
This paper assumes that, like the notion of risk itself, all knowledge (lay and expert) is socially 
and culturally constructed (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003: p. 1; Zinn, 2004: p. 5) as well as, perhaps 
particularly in the cases of fisheries, being mediated by ecology. It is, in other words, a social-
ecological product mediated by the history, location and experiences of the knower (Dolan et al., 
2005: p.2). Constructionist positions are often taken to be the opposite of realist approaches. 
However, Wynne (2002: p.462) suggests that this is a false dualism. Rather, he calls for 
“constructivist-realism,” an approach that opens space for more nuanced and comprehensive 
understandings of the “real.”  He argues,  
 
[p]hysical reality still courses through these contending and overtly less 
determinate representations and meanings, but different versions of reality are not 
only competing in the sense of claiming or denying the reality of an element of 
nature. They may also be making conflicting claims that a real element is more 
salient once one gives the issue a particular meaning. The same natural reality 
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thus shows up differently, depending on the intersections it is given with human 
questions and commitments (Wynne, 2002: p.462).  
 
From this perspective, expert-scientific risk knowledge does not reflect only an “objective” 
reality and is not the only way of getting at “the real.” It is, instead, the hegemonic way of talking 
about, identifying and managing risk and safety used by governing agencies and reflects the 
social-cultural dynamics of those agencies. Using a constructivist-realist approach, we can 
interpret the differences between experts’ and fish harvesters’ ways of identifying and 
understanding risks as reflecting differences in when, where and how they observe their world 
and in the way they interpret those observations. The view from the deck of the vessel, fish 
harvesters’ experiences on the water, not only informs their observations and interpretations of 
risk but offers potential insights into risk and into expert claims about risk that should be taken 
into account when trying to understand fishing risk and improve safety.   
 
There is no single, objective place from which to assess risk and the best way to assess and 
minimize risk is through interdisciplinary and intersectoral approaches, seeking input from a 
variety of different knowledge agents focusing on different sources and dimensions of risk and 
using multiple methodologies. In this paper, I draw on Wynne’s work on constructivist-realism 
and on the feminist literature on masculinity to examine fish harvesters’ understandings and 
experiences of risk and safety in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador on Canada’s east 
coast. Using data drawn from focus groups, phone interviews and particularly from individual 
boat tours with Newfoundland fish harvesters, I argue that their understandings and practices of 
risk and safety are dynamic and that this dynamism reflects the intersection of everyday 
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requirements to get the job done in what are often uncertain and constrained circumstances 
associated with the interacting and changing regulatory, industrial and environmental contexts in 
which this work is done. From this perspective, while quantifying fisheries risks in terms of 
fatality, accident or Search and Rescue incident rates is important, the inclusion of fish 
harvesters’ experiences and related safety knowledge in research and policy-development 
designed to reduce risk is imperative. This approach is also a means to promote understanding 
and awareness among those including harvesters, safety experts and policy–makers with an 
interest in minimizing risk through co-management of safety.  
 
I also argue that harvesters’ knowledge, experience and responses to dynamic environments are 
mediated by the ways in which gender structures fisheries work and its cultural meanings for 
men. This kind of gendered approach is conspicuously absent from much of the research on 
occupational health and safety, including fishing safety, and risk (see Stella, 1996 for an 
exception). With some notable exceptions, namely recent case studies in the construction 
(Iacuone, 2005; Paap, 2003) and mining (Somerville & Abrahamsson, 2003) industries, the 
occupational health and safety literature tends to ignore gender or assume a male subject 
(Messing, 1998). In the wider literature on risk, where it appears, gender is treated as a variable 
mediating risk perceptions or preferences (see Finucane et al., 2000; Gustafson, 1998).  
 
Masculinity is not only, if it is at all, simply a personality trait that causes risk-taking behaviour 
or shapes risk perception. The story is more complex than this. Gender is a way of ordering 
social practice in relation to reproduction at the individual, interactional, symbolic and 
institutional levels, and it does so in ways that reflect and reproduce patriarchal ideologies and 
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structures (Connell, 1995: p. 71-3). From this perspective, masculinities and femininities are 
historically- and culturally-specific places in gender relations – places that are different and 
unequal -- that organise divisions of labour; shape access to wealth, resources and power; inform 
bodily practices; and order symbolic representations, values and meanings (Connell 1995, p. 71; 
Kimmel, 2001, p.21).  One’s place within gender relations has implications for the acquisition of 
knowledge and for how risk is interpreted and experienced. 
 
 
Methods 
 
These findings derive from an analysis of data collected in one component of a multi-layered, 
multidisciplinary project on fishing safety carried out by researchers through SafetyNet.1 The 
project data I present here were collected for the Perceptions of Risk component of this larger 
1 This research was funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research Grant CAHR-43269 
through SafetyNet, a Community Research Alliance on Health and Safety in Marine and Coastal 
Work based at Memorial University in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. 
Funding was also provided by Memorial University, the Newfoundland and Labrador Centre for 
Applied Health Research, and the National Search and Rescue Secretariat New Initiatives Fund. 
Community collaborators George Chafe representing the Small Fishing Vessel Safety 
Committee, Mark Dolomount representing the Professional Fish Harvesters Certification Board, 
and Graham Small representing the Offshore Safety and Survival Centre, Marine Institute 
provided input into the design of the research and helped recruit participants. I would like to 
thank Dr.’s Barbara Neis and Marian Binkley for their input into the design and conduct of this 
research. Barbara Neis also reviewed earlier drafts of this paper and provided useful comments. 
Sandra Brennan, a masters student in Sociology and research assistants Nancy Leawood, Melissa 
Kennedy and Julie Matthews helped with data collection, data entry and data analysis. Dr. 
Michael Murray provided useful input during early phases of the research. Ethics clearance for 
this research was provided by the Human Investigations Committee at Memorial University and 
the Human Research Ethics Board at Dalhousie University.  
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project. The main objective of the Perceptions of Risk component were to document 
Newfoundland fish harvesters’ experiences and understandings of fishery risks in a decade of 
environmental and industrial restructuring after the closure of Newfoundland’s groundfish 
fisheries in the early 1990s (Dolan et al., 2005), including their views on the effectiveness of 
safety initiatives introduced as part of a professionalization program introduced in the 1990s and 
in an effort to reduce risk in the under 65 foot vessel sectors.2  
 
The Perceptions of Risk component used a mixed methods approach including focus groups, 
phone interviews and boat tours. Recruitment to the focus groups began with a list of names of 
fish harvesters involved in the professionalization program, many of whom instructed safety 
courses in different areas of Newfoundland, provided by the Professional Fish Harvesters 
Certification Board (PFHCB). We contacted these fish harvesters and they provided names and 
contact information for harvesters in their areas who they thought would be interested in 
participating. The latter were contacted and those we were able to reach were invited to 
participate in a focus group in their area. The focus groups took place between March 2003 and 
December 2004. Sessions lasted between two and a half and three hours. Participants were asked 
to complete a voluntary, short, self-administered demographic questionnaire. Focus group 
sessions followed an agenda of discussion topics distributed to participants at the start of the 
focus group. Sessions were audio-taped, transcribed and transcripts were analysed using NVivo 
qualitative software.  
 
2 The report providing a general report of the findings from the overall SafeCatch project is 
available on the SafetyNet website  http://www.safetynet.mun.ca/pdfs/POR.pdf . 
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A total of 17 focus groups were completed involving 94 fish harvesters (83 men and 11 women) 
from the island portion of the province. Participants ranged in age from 23 to 65 years and the 
average age was 44 years. The average age when participants had started fishing commercially 
was 20 years but was much higher for women at 31 years. These harvesters were predominantly 
from the under 35 foot and 35-65 foot sectors. Snow crab, groundfish, herring, and lobster were 
the most widely reported species fished by participants. Sixty-eight harvesters reported current 
involvement in the inshore fishery and 44 in the longliner fishery. Seventy-one respondents had 
taken formal fishery training courses. At least 65 were skippers, and 68 reported having core 
status. In terms of professionalisation designations, 64 identified as level II, five as level I, and 
five as apprentice. Among the 11 women participants only one had core status and only four had 
level II status.  
 
The phone interview schedule was developed drawing on insights from the focus groups and on 
survey questionnaires used in earlier, similar research on fish harvesters’ perceptions of risk. 
Survey questions asked harvesters about their experiences fishing in 2004.  The survey 
instrument was pre-tested and adjusted and was shortened after each pre-test. Our original goal 
was to survey a random sample of 100 professional fish harvesters stratified on the basis of 
region and on the basis of level of professional certification. To find our sample, we asked the 
PFHCB to generate a stratified random sample of 600 names from its list of professional fish 
harvesters, which includes all registered fish harvesters in Newfoundland. In the spring of 2005, 
the PFHCB mailed a package of information to each of these individuals containing information 
about the study, a letter of support from the PFHCB, a contact reply form and a stamped, self-
addressed envelope for those interested in participating. We received only 35 responses to this 
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initial mail-out and, from these, were able to complete 25 phone interviews. We attribute the low 
response rate to this initial request to turmoil in the industry that erupted in the snow crab fishery 
around the time of the mailout, and to the fact that the mailout took place after many harvesters 
were back fishing.  
 
We attempted to increase our response rate for the survey by asking the PFHCB to send a second 
package of information to the same participants in September. We received 19 responses to this 
second mail-out and, from these, managed to complete 15 interviews. We also discussed the 
research during a radio interview with the host of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s 
Fisheries Broadcast during which we issued an invitation to harvesters to participate. This 
advertisement generated an additional three responses (calls to a secure, toll free line) and to the 
return of one more contact reply form from our original sample. In light of the overall low 
response rate to these multiple initiatives, we revisited the last few pre-test interviews we had 
conducted using a version of the survey instrument that was very close to the final version and, 
with the permission of three individuals, re-classified their interviews from pre-test to test 
interviews. Thus, our total number of completed surveys for this component is 46.  This is not a 
large enough sample to generalize to the harvester population, but these lengthy surveys have 
provided a very important source of additional information for this component. The fish 
harvesters we interviewed by phone started fishing between the ages of 10 and 32 years (average 
of 16.8 years), and they ranged in age from 22 to 67 years (average of 47.4).  Years fishing 
ranged: 4 had fished 15 years or less; 18 had fished between 15 and 29 years; and, 24 had fished 
for 30 years or longer. Forty-one percent of those surveyed had not graduated from high school. 
All 46 had received some formal training related to fishing ranging from a Basic Safety Training 
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course to qualifications in Marine Engineering or Marine Diesel Mechanics. Sixty-seven per cent 
of fish harvesters surveyed worked in the less than 35’ sector and 32 had core status.  Of the 
harvesters interviewed, 27 were skippers and the rest crew.   
 
We also completed ten boat tours, seven on vessels under 35 feet in length and three on vessels 
measuring between 35 and 65 feet. The boat tours took place on harvesters’ vessels, while 
docked, and combined qualitative interviews, with demonstrations, observation and a mapping 
exercise. During the boat tours harvesters were asked what they did to fish safely and to identify 
risky activities and their locations on the vessel. They were then asked to describe and, where 
possible, re-enact their strategies for dealing with them. Participants were asked to add details to 
a generic diagram of a vessel deck to make it match their workspace and to identify on the 
diagram places or tasks they perceived to be risky or dangerous. The resultant maps serve as 
visual representations of perceived workplace risks and were also used to illustrate steps they 
took to reduce risk. The mapping tool was adapted from an occupational health and safety 
research tool developed for industrial environments.3  
 
The focus groups enabled the collection of information related to the broad theme of fishing risk. 
This information provides valuable insights into the safety-related aspects of changes in fishing 
over the decade between the groundfish moratoria and the time of the research. Focus group 
discussions may trigger ideas and information that might be overlooked or forgotten in one-on-
one interviews but these data lack the depth of experience and information that can be derived 
3 Thanks to Dorothy Wigmore for introducing Nicole Power to this methodology and to Dwayne 
White for designing the generic map of a fishing vessel deck used in the boat tours. 
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from detailed one-on-one interviews. The semi-public nature of focus groups also, however, 
means some individuals will not speak openly about certain kinds of concerns or events. This is 
perhaps particularly true for crew members. The focus group data guided the design of the phone 
interview schedule. These were designed to test verbal, formal knowledge and, in this case, the 
generalizability of our findings by accessing more harvesters including some from regions where 
we were not able to hold focus groups. Neither the focus groups nor the phone interviews were, 
however, very good at accessing the experiential and embodied dimensions of work and risk. 
One of the goals of the boat tours was to move from a discussion organized mainly around 
perceived risks to one that included the strategies used by skippers and captains to keep 
themselves and their crew safe. The boat tours moved safety and risk discussions on to vessels 
and provided an opportunity for a small group of harvesters to act out certain activities and to 
map sources of risk as well as strategies for dealing with them thereby opening up new 
opportunities for discussion and exploration and reducing the chance of misunderstanding on the 
part of the researcher.  
 
 
Risk Knowledges in a Context of Change  
 
Major environmental, policy and industrial shifts are radically altering Newfoundland’s fisheries 
with important health consequences (Dolan et al., 2005). With the collapse of the groundfish 
stocks and closure of these fisheries, there was an industrial shift in target species from cod to 
shellfish, especially snow crab, and from fleet with a substantial number of large-scale trawlers 
to one dominated almost exclusively by vessels less than 65 feet in length. Changes in fleet 
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structure and targeted species resulted in an increase in offshore activity in the under 65 foot 
sector associated with a shift from cod to snow crab and shrimp.  
 
Fisheries management also changed in response to the groundfish collapses. There was a 
regulatory shift from Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and gear limitations for the smaller boat 
sector to Individual Quotas (IQs) that allocate quotas to individual enterprises or harvesters. At 
the level of practice, the owner-operator and fleet separation policies are being undermined as 
quotas are increasingly treated as property, bought and sold under the guise of so-called trust 
agreements (Praxis, 2005: p.35). Current “replacement license” policy allows the use of the 
license to be separated from its title, which in practice allows the purchaser – another fish 
harvester, a non-fish harvester or a company -- to use a license that is in a different name from 
that of  the purchaser (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1996).  
 
In 1997 the Department of Fisheries and Oceans instituted a targeted reclassification scheme that 
divides fish harvesters in the under 65 foot fleet into core and non-core categories. To limit 
capacity, there is exclusive membership in the core group, entry into which is through 
replacement and conditional on meeting prerequisites including having an enterprise and key 
licenses, and establishing attachment to and dependency on the fishery (Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans, 1996, 2001: p. 24). These categories are used to determine who gets what fisheries 
resources, with core fish harvesters having privileged access to replacement and new licenses 
and vessels. The core classification system is linked to the PFHCB’s professional designation 
scheme. Together the PFHCB and the Professional Fish Harvesters Act have entrenched a set of 
criteria, including apprenticeship programs, formal training and experience requirements, to 
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determine fish harvesters’ professionalisation status. Fish harvesters can move forward along the 
Board's gradient designations – from Apprentice Fish Harvester, to Level I, and finally to Level 
II – as they acquire formal training credits and sea time (PFHCB, 2007).  
 
The PFHCB also plays an active role in the area of fishing safety. The PFHCB has an advisory 
role to direct safety policy. The Board also delivers a safety training course largely to its 
apprentices. This safety training course includes the Marine Emergency Duties A3 course, first 
aid and an introduction to safe fishing vessel operations and general seamanship and stability. At 
the federal level, Transport Canada has made mandatory for all fish harvesters the completion of 
a Marine Emergency Duties course by 2007. In addition to its focus on training individual fish 
harvesters, the regulatory response to safety has focused on mandatory safety equipment (based 
on vessel length and tonnage, and fishing distance from shore) and is aimed at minimising the 
risk of sinking, collisions, fire, and foundering. Combined the fishing safety regulations and 
training direct attention to survival and what to do when things go wrong with the boat.  
 
The increased focus on safety in the <65 foot sectors in recent years is in part a response to 
government-funded research showing increased rates of SAR incidents and Worker 
Compensation claims in that sector that appear to be linked to environmental and industrial 
restructuring. In a review of SAR incidents between 1993 and 1999, Wiseman et al. (2000) 
identifies an increase in the annual number of incidents despite a decrease in the number of 
fishing vessels over the same period. He also noted a parallel trend between the number of SAR 
incidents and Worker Compensation claims. Pelot’s (2000) longitudinal analysis of SAR 
incidents and fishing activity in the same period shows that while inshore fishing areas had low 
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and steady incident rates, offshore fishing areas had increasingly higher incident rates. Pelot 
links this increase to increased fishing activity in the offshore with the restructuring from cod to 
crab. In their review of Worker Compensation claims, Binkley et al. (2006) find that between 
1992 and 1995 the number of claims declined considerably, and between 1996 and 2001 there 
was a gradual increase and then levelling off in the number of claims. Binkley et al. explain: 
 
[t]he early decline in the number of claims is probably partly due to the decline in 
the workforce wrought by the imposition of the Groundfish Moratoria in 1992/3 
and to related reductions in hours of exposure for individual harvesters during the 
early years of the moratoria. But over the same period the make-up of the fishing 
fleet changed dramatically as well and was reflected in a change in the 
proportions of claims from the various sectors, notably the decline in the offshore 
fishery, and the relative and absolute growth in the inshore (2006: p.10). 
 
 
These reports give us a good impression of the overall patterns of major risk incidents. They do 
not, however, provide a sense of how fish harvesters manage and negotiate risks on a day to day 
basis within this context of industrial and regulatory change. In the remainder of this paper, I 
outline some of the ways in which fish harvesters talk about risk and safety and some of the 
strategies they use for dealing with risk and uncertainty. The data reveal two, sometimes 
competing, sets of risk and safety knowledges and practices. One is grounded in the official 
discourses about risk and safety that emphasises formal training, vessel design and safety 
equipment. The other is rooted in everyday work experience; it emphasises the work platform, 
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experience on the water and hands-on learning.  There was, on the one hand, much support for 
mandatory safety training and equipment among respondents who had participated in training 
and were actively involved in the professionalisation movement, and also among younger fish 
harvesters. On the other hand, there was a competing understanding of safety, one that claimed 
that classroom-based learning cannot replace experience and “commonsense.” One possible 
interpretation of this is that the latter position reflects resistance to what harvesters perceive as 
“over-regulation” which they find threatening and feel is undermining their work autonomy, a 
culturally valued aspect of fishing work. Another possibility is that those who reject training are 
denying risk. Yet, even those fish harvesters active in professionalisation tended to support the 
claim that experience and commonsense were invaluable in mitigating risk. Indeed, this is 
reconciled in their certification process that credits both formal training and sea time. A 
resistance, even if partial, to the official risk knowledge may reflect that it alone is not enough to 
keep fish harvesters safe in the everyday work environment. To examine this tension further, I 
discuss the case of rope, an example of an everyday risk identified by harvesters that is not 
considered in the formal regulation of risk and safety, and how fish harvesters use their 
“commonsense knowledge” to negotiate strategies to deal with this risk. I then move to a 
discussion about fish harvesters’ responses when this commonsense knowledge does not quite fit 
the new fishing context.  
 
 
The Case of Rope 
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Over and over again in the focus groups, fish harvesters identified entanglement in gear and rope 
as an everyday risk. While harvesters in the under 65 foot sector must mitigate the risk of gear 
and rope entanglement when targeting a range of species, I will focus here on snow crab. And 
while working with rope is not a new phenomenon, harvesting snow crab is particularly 
problematic because it is a deep sea fishery, requiring high volumes of rope, and as the photos in 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, deck space is cramped. When setting, moving or retrieving crab gear, 
vessels often carry between four and twelve strings or fleets of crab pots with a total of between 
200 and 600 pots. Each string contains between one and one and a half miles of rope. This means 
working with miles of rope in very cramped quarters, on vessels under 65 feet, even under 35 
feet in length.  
 
When setting pots, harvesters run the risk of becoming tangled in the rope (and potentially losing 
limbs) and being dragged overboard. Harvesters must negotiate moving rope underfoot while 
standing on a rolling, often slippery, platform in addition to carrying out their task at hand. 
 
I’d say for most fishermen, it’s a daily occurrence. There’s something going to 
happen, right?  There’s always something that can happen.  You know you’re 
standing on a boat in the middle of the ocean, if you’re setting gear, you’re by the 
gear, you’re tangled up in the rope. You’re holding on the gear going over the 
back of her. And you’re hauling gear; there’s rope going, pots going over your 
head. It’s only a little slip up and your neck is broke or you’re drowned. There’s 
nobody looking out for you. One fella’s doing his job, another fella doing his job. 
(FH013, FG03) 
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 [Y]ou’re gone out there one o’clock in the morning started off, and the wind 
perhaps subsided and when you’re going out there, there’s three men on deck, or 
four men on deck and there’s rope pouring out. A fella turned his head for a 
minute and the rope comes around his ankle or whatever, you could have a man 
overboard, right?  Pretty quick. I know with me, that’s what I bes uneasy about. 
(FH046, FG09) 
 
You’re doing about four or five knots and that rope is just coming from all parts 
around you.  Make sure you’re clear of that.  You get it turned around your foot, 
they gotta go with ‘im.  There’s no breaks in the rope. (FH049, FG10) 
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Figure 1: Crab pots on 35 foot vessel 
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Figure 2: Miles of rope stored in the hold. 
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The POR team used the boat tours with captains and skippers to collect detailed information 
about risks and the ways in which fish harvesters keep themselves safe in relation to risks. 
During the tours, we asked the question: “How do you stay safe while fishing?” Harvesters 
described numerous strategies to mitigate the risk of entanglement. In terms of vessel design and 
construction, they have sought to maximize the deck space available but their ability to do that is 
limited by cost and by vessel length and volume limits outlined in the Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans’ vessel replacement regulations (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2001: p.34). 
Reconciling the demand for space with these constraints has included the purchase of longer 
vessels which are then shortened, widening and deepening their vessels, and moving the 
wheelhouse closer to the bow. Despite these structural modifications, they often end up with 
extremely limited deck space and still miles of rope to manage.   
 
Other strategies reflect attempts to minimize the movement of the gear and rope and to control 
the pathways through which the rope flows. They do this by shooting pots in calm weather and 
during daylight hours, keeping stacks of pots low and tied down, securing moving parts with 
stays, applying carpet and non-skid paint to their decks to minimize the risk of slipping, and 
generally trying to keep their deck clean and tidy. Some control rope by manipulating their 
shooting speed. Harvesters also reported strategies for managing bodies in relation to rope. To 
avoid becoming tangled in rope, skippers or captains instruct crew to minimize the movement of 
their feet on the deck by bracing their legs against the deck, gunnel or railing. Crew members 
also tend to do the same job all the time and greenhorns are assigned to easier, safer jobs. While 
shooting, skippers restrict the number of crew on deck to those required to shoot the pots. Others 
hire crew whose job it is to watch the moving rope. One way to minimize the crew movement, 
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and hence risk, is to set up an assembly line for shooting pots in which one worker takes a pot 
from the stack, baits and ties it, rolls it to another, who then passes it to a third to shoot off the 
gunnel.  
 
Figure 1 is a visual representation of some of these strategies. It is a composite of some of the 
work platform maps that fish harvesters participating in the boat tours used to demonstrate how 
they managed rope. Here the rope is pounded off behind the wheelhouse. The moving rope is 
kept close to the hatch as it moves towards the stern where the pots are stacked. A crew member 
passes or rolls the pot to the shooter who pushes it overboard. This assembly line helps control 
the line of rope moving from the stacks over the starboard side. In Figure 2 the rope of the buoy 
and main lines are stored next to the wheelhouse. The rope is kept close to the hatch as it moves 
towards the stern where the pots are stacked.    
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 Figure 3: Work platform map: rope pounded off behind the wheelhouse
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Figure 4: Work platform map: Rope stored next to wheelhouse
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Commonsense, embodiment and masculinity 
 
Fish harvesters described their practices with rope as “commonsense”. But acquiring 
commonsense or claiming commonsense knowledge of this kind presupposes direct and indirect 
experience that has been accumulated through practice, hands-on work and bodily exercise 
(Power, 2005: p.139). The personal work histories of “traditional” 4 fish harvesters include long 
careers on the water, accumulated experience and skill, and possession of inter-generational 
know-how. This is reflected in our survey results where 85% of fish harvesters reported learning 
about risk and safety by trial and error, 70% from their father, and 74% from a skipper. The 
everyday work of fishing requires a bodily strategy to deal with physical work in a liquid, and 
thus uncertain, environment. The local way of talking about fishing as “in the blood” captures 
this habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) or bodily capital (Wacquant, 1995) acquired through the day to day 
practice of mundane work routines. To quote Wacquant (1995, p.67), “[b]odily capital and 
bodily labor are thus linked by a recursive relation which makes them closely dependent on one 
another” (emphasis in original).  
 
Embodied knowledge is difficult to quantify or understand without being experienced. But these 
experiences and claims to these local discourses are mediated by a gender structure that informs 
not just any body. Rather, it is generally the masculine body that mediates the requirements of 
everyday work. Women are not able to claim in the same ways that fishing is "in the blood" 
4 The word “traditional” is used in the local culture to describe ways of doing things that have an 
assumed local history. It is also referenced in official government documents, though the 
definition does not always coincide with local interpretations. See Power (2005) for a more 
detailed discussion.  
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(Power, 2005: p.98).  Acquisition of commonsense, then, is a "bodily exercise" (Palsson, 2000: 
p.37) organised by gender and mediated by a particular version of masculinity, that has its basis 
in local understandings of the “traditional.”  
 
Gender organises industrial- and community-based divisions of labour and space that delineate 
men’s work, including its symbolic order and meanings (Power, 2005: ch.3). Harvesters view 
this work as challenging, allowing them an opportunity to “be their own boss.” “Being a 
fisherman” -- working outdoors, independently -- has been the cultural ideal for men in rural 
Newfoundland. This fishing is work that must be understood in relation to the past, tradition, and 
a way of life. It is connected to larger narratives of hard times and survival, to a collective 
identity, and to a pride of place. These cultural meanings are created and recreated in many 
ways, one of which is through story-telling. This is increasingly done through the media, 
especially in the coverage of marine tragedies. Stories highlight certain risks in fishing and 
attempt to explain the causes of accidents, injuries and loss of life. These stories also impart 
meanings about what it means to be a fish harvester and a man. Discursively at least, fish 
harvesters become heroes when they die at sea.  
 
This gender structure has also shaped access to wealth and resources, within larger exploitative 
capitalist relations. This is reflected in local patterns of patrilineal inheritance and the patriarchal 
state policies that support these patterns (Neis, 1993; Neis & Williams, 1997). Boys and young 
men have access to fishing property, inter-generational know-how and observations of the 
goings-on in the world of men. And current professionalisation and licensing and quota schemes 
uphold this “patriarchal dividend” (Connell, 1995: p.79). In Newfoundland and Labrador, access 
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to fishing licenses and quotas is limited through professionalization and membership in the core 
fishery. Here, as elsewhere, few women are eligible because they lack direct fishing capital or 
property, and do not own any or at least key licenses (Grzetic, 2004:p. 19-21;  Munk-Madsen, 
1998: p.234). The criteria developed for professional advancement in the industry assume a male 
entrepreneur embedded in a fishing enterprise unencumbered by family responsibilities, like 
domestic and child responsibilities, which constrain access to the training and mean women often 
have shorter or interrupted fishing careers and thus less total and annual fisheries income. The 
processing sector, where women tend to work, is not part of the professionalization. All of these 
things serve to strengthen male control of the fishery. 
 
It is within these gendered divisions of labour, gendered access to resources, and gendered 
material, bodily and symbolic systems that men acquire “commonsense” related to safety. The 
example of injury and disability illustrates this interconnectivity. Harvesters in this study largely 
accepted that certain bodily injury is “normal” and part of the job. At the same time, if serious 
enough, work-related disability can undermine a man’s ability to adhere to locally valued 
masculine constructions (Murray, 2005). In the absence of extensive safety regulation for vessels 
measuring under 35 feet in length, the gendered acquisition of commonsense has meant that, 
until recently, safety was regulated through informal apprenticeships and mentoring – the quality 
of which has been undoubtedly variable – serving to both enhance and mitigate risk. The point 
here is not to assess the effectiveness of strategies used by fish harvesters to deal with risk. It 
might be, for example, that some of the strategies to deal with the risks entailed in working with 
rope are, in fact, rather risky. Instead, it is to suggest that examining risk in the context of fish 
harvesters’ everyday and gendered lives provides another lens through which to understand risk, 
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and in doing so, reveals the possible limitations of relying only on official risk knowledges, 
especially if the goal is indeed to reduce risk in the everyday working lives of fish harvesters.  
 
 
Shifting Knowledges 
 
The shift from cod to snow crab brings with it the challenges of fishing unfamiliar grounds for a 
new target species using new vessel designs and equipment. This has resulted in the creation of 
“inexperienced harvesters” -- harvesters who have a comprehensive knowledge of a particular 
fishery in particular coastal locations and of particular technologies but who now fish new 
grounds for new target species using newly designed or modified vessels and new technologies. 
These conditions make unlikely the easy transfer of traditional, commonsense knowledge and 
practice to the current fishing context. The shift from cod to snow crab has also meant shorter 
fishing seasons and if embodied “commonsense” knowledge is acquired on the job, a shorter 
season means less opportunity to acquire it. Shorter fishing seasons also mean longer periods of 
time on land, and thus bodies may not adjust to work at sea as readily as they once did.  
 
Fish harvesters have actively responded to these new challenges, uncertainties, and even gaps in 
their knowledge. The particular ways in which harvesters manage rope in the snow crab fishery 
is one example of how harvesters have adapted existing safety practices to reflect the new risks 
and challenges associated with the snow crab fishery. During the early years of their involvement 
in this fishery, many fished in small, aging, and inappropriately designed boats. Over time, most 
modified their boats -- widening, deepening or moving into larger vessels where possible, 
29 
 
adapted gear and added safety equipment to reflect the risks and challenges of fishing further 
from shore including crossing and sometimes fishing in or near major shipping lanes. Because 
fishing trips now take longer as snow crab fishing necessitates travelling farther from shore, 
vessel space required to accommodate gear and sleeping quarters and storage for provisions. 
Such investment has resulted in a major transformation in the vessel as a site in which to do work 
and learn how to fish. Today’s ideal “65 footers” (see Figure 5) or “super 35s”5 are substantially 
different from the traditional trap skiff, an undecked boat, ranging in length from 20 to 30 feet, 
commonly used in the Newfoundland groundfishery in the past.  
5 These are vessels that 35 feet in length but have been widened and heightened to such a degree 
that they appear to be almost cubical in shape.  
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Figure 5: An ideal 65 footer 
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These vessels are much larger, and are equipped with sophisticated navigation (such as radar and 
Global Positioning Systems), communication (cell phones) and life-saving (life rafts and 
immersion suits) technologies. In some cases, certain technologies are mandatory, especially for 
vessels measuring over 35 feet in length. There is evidence in the focus group, survey and boat 
tour data that harvesters sometimes equate new, especially larger, vessels or their new 
technologies with safety. Some vessels are fitted with certain technologies in duplicate. Fish 
harvesters identified this as a safety strategy. The underlying assumption is that should 
something go wrong, the technologies (or the backup technologies) or the vessel will protect 
them. This tendency to equate safety with such technologies and with larger vessels exists 
alongside a recognition that technologies can both change and create as well as mitigate risk. For 
example, the introduction of hydraulic equipment is thought to simultaneously decrease such 
long-term health-risks as back problems, but increase other risks such as injury from getting 
caught in equipment.  
 
In light of this context of uncertainty and change, fish harvesters largely assessed formal safety 
training as valuable. This assessment also likely reflects the widespread compliance in our 
sample with the relatively recent regulation requiring all fish harvesters to complete, by 2007, a 
Marine Emergency Duties course. Eighty percent of survey respondents reported learning about 
risk and safety in formal training. Acceptance of formal training appears to be linked to age. In 
the phone survey, older fish harvesters were less likely to place a lot of importance on training 
than younger harvesters (Figure 6).  Yet, even where older harvesters were unlikely to see the 
value of training for themselves, they tended to accept its value for young people. This makes 
sense in light of recent trends that make difficult the acquisition or relevance of commonsense 
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knowledge through established means, including the shift in target species and fishing location, 
shorter fishing seasons, changes in crew recruitment and retention, new economic arrangements 
and the increased use of larger vessels and new technologies. 
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Figure 6: Importance of Safety Training as reported by participants in the POR survey (from 
Brennan, forthcoming). 
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To a large degree, the Marine Emergency Duties courses reinforce the idea that risk and safety 
are embedded in the vessel and its technologies. These courses focus on emergency responses, 
primarily on how to use safety technologies when the vessel and other technologies fail and do 
not directly deal with the risks of day to day fishing. The PFHCB’s apprentice course though 
attempts to reconcile this tension by combining the Marine Emergency Duties A3 course with an 
introduction to safe fishing vessel operations and general seamanship and stability. While 
professionalisation recognises experience (as accumulated sea time), it has also institutionalised 
a status system that is based on quantified formal training.  
 
 
Shifting masculinities 
 
Just as acquiring commonsense takes place within gender relations, so too does the formal 
learning process. The fisherman is the presumed target of formal training. Despite the fact that 
the PFHCB’s version of the Marine Emergency Duties A3 course in particular has been heavily 
subscribed to by women, there persists, even among some instructors, a widespread belief that 
women do not really fish.6 This reflects the widespread yet unsubstantiated belief that women 
are falsely recorded as crew members on vessels to gain access to Employment Insurance 
benefits. In fact, provincial participation rates for women fish harvesters increased from eight per 
6 This finding is based on data from a linked project entitled, “The Fishing Safety Training 
Project. This project was funded by the Newfoundland and Labrador Centre for Applied Health 
Research.  
 
35 
 
                                                          
cent in 1981 to 20 per cent by 2000 (Grzetic, 2004: p. 17). The increased participation of women 
in harvesting means that men, and women, must negotiate work and learning spaces that have 
new gender arrangements.  
 
To illustrate, let’s consider how investment in particular vessel designs and technologies may be 
linked to the reconfiguring of masculinity. Most fish harvesters described the snow crab fishery 
as dangerous, but there was also a tendency to feminise it, describing it as lacking 
competitiveness and requiring little skill. According to this line of thinking, the new management 
strategy of IQs for snow crab reduces competition – with positive consequences for safety -- at 
least while stocks are plentiful and there is control of the timing of the fishery. IQs mean there is 
no competition to catch as much snow crab before the total allowable catch is landed. Fish 
harvesters can therefore ideally decide when to harvest “their” snow crab and they have a general 
sense about how much money they will earn before leaving the wharf. This is, of course, 
provided they find the snow crab, which according to many respondents, is not so difficult with 
the latest fish-finding equipment and the limited mobility of snow crab. The underlining 
assumption here is that snow crab fishing does not require the same level of skill as was 
demanded in the hunt for cod. This perceived feminization of snow crab harvesting may also 
reflect the perceived reduction of physicality required to do the work associated with the 
introduction of hydraulics, and the increased presence of women on board vessels. 
 
If fisheries as sites of work are interpreted as feminine, this has implications for the ways in 
which men perform masculinity. The changing regulatory and industrial context seems to 
encourage harvesters to invest in a masculinity that values professional status, business ethics 
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and sophisticated vessels and technologies. This direction is not lost on fish harvesters who say 
there is tremendous pressure to choose between “going bigger” or getting out. A common 
interpretation among respondents was that larger boats (measuring over 35 feet) are necessary to 
acquire quotas and to fish crab successfully. As fishing work and harvesters’ relationship to risk 
and safety are increasingly mediated by sophisticated technologies and larger vessels, 
inexperience and gaps in knowledge may pose new risks -- risks that are not addressed in the 
Marine Emergency Duties courses. The tendency to for some harvesters to equate safety with 
owning technologies and larger vessels could contribute to a tendency to take greater risks.  
Also, some of the new navigation, communication and safety technologies require specialized 
knowledge (beyond the scope of a Marine Emergency Duties Course) to operate them. 
Navigational technologies, such as Global Position Systems (GPS), are very helpful when 
traveling to offshore grounds for gear retrieval, staying on course and reducing the risk of 
collision. However, over-reliance on these technologies and potential knowledge gaps related to 
their safe operation can undermine safety. Electronic equipment like GPS technology and laptop 
computers with digital charts often ceases to operate when power supplies fail and, therefore, can 
be useless when engines fail.  GPS technologies can help plot a course and make it easy to return 
to particular grounds and gear but may not distinguish between water and land. Thus reliance on 
GPS technology has been associated with fishing vessel groundings.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Fish harvesters’ understandings and practices of risk and safety are complex and dynamic. A 
focus on everyday fisheries risks and practices shifts the discussion away from incident rates and 
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directs attention to day to day work routines and fish harvesters’ culturally specific 
“commonsense” knowledge about risk and safety. In so doing, it demonstrates how official 
agencies and models that rely on quantifying incidents may miss entirely such mundane risks as 
working with rope. A focus on the everyday lives of fish harvesters also points to their agency in 
their attempts to manage and negotiate new fisheries risks associated with snow crab harvesting. 
And, contrary to the assumption in Beck’s risk society thesis (2005) that traditional social 
structures are no longer important, this case study makes clear that more nuanced considerations 
of fisheries risks must consider how risk is mediated by and mediates gender and others 
structures of inequality. Risk and safety are not isolated “things” out there to be revealed, 
counted, and neatly governed. Risk and safety are negotiated in specific, gendered contexts.  
 
Over the past decade, we have been witnessing a shift in the local meanings of safety and risk 
and in what it means to be a fisherman. This shift is not complete nor has it been linear. It seems 
clear however that a convergence of sorts is occurring – with the state and industry supporting a 
masculine entrepreneurial and vessel-oriented approach to OHS. This convergence has 
implications for safety but the connections are sometimes not clear because they are mediated by 
gender – often an invisible or assumed masculinity. This study on the Newfoundland fisheries 
demonstrates the important contributions feminist sociology can make to risk and OHS research. 
Feminist sociology helps reveal tensions and competing constructions of safety as well as the 
wider social structures, particularly gender, that mediate understandings of safety and practices.  
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